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a b s t r a c t
We study the complexity of finding extreme pure Nash equilibria in symmetric
(unweighted) network congestion games. In our context best and worst equilibria are
those with minimum respectively maximummakespan. On series–parallel graphs a worst
Nash equilibrium can be found by a Greedy approach while finding a best equilibrium is
NP-hard. For a fixed number of users we give a pseudo-polynomial algorithm to find the
best equilibrium in series–parallel networks. For general network topologies also finding a
worst equilibrium is NP-hard.
© 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
In the last years there has been a lot of interest in algorithmic game theory combining aspects of game theory and
computer science. Driven by growing demand for faster and larger communication networksmore andmore questionswere
asked: How do non-cooperative users interact in such networks where increasing load on individual parts of the network
causes a degradation in service, often in the form of reduced transfer speed? How does this congestion effect influence the
whole network? Is there some kind of self-regulation among the users? Classical game theory provides qualitative answers
such as existence of equilibria, states of the network in which all users are satisfied, and computer scientists added more
quantitative questions and concepts. It is awell known fact (cf. Pigou [19]), that in general selfish non-cooperative behaviour
does not lead to social optimal outcome. Papadimitriou [18] coined the term price of anarchy for the ratio of the social cost
of a worst Nash equilibrium and the minimum social cost. The KP-Model named after Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [16]
describes the situation in which users of possibly different sizes assign their traffic to parallel links with linear latency
functions. For pure assignments this corresponds to uniform/related machines in scheduling. For this game many results
concerning not only the pure and mixed price of anarchy [5,17,9] but also e.g. Nashification [8] or convergence of greedy
selfish steps [8] were analyzed. Fotakis et al. [10] came up with the question whether a best or worst pure equilibrium
w.r.t. makespan can be computed efficiently and established that in the KP-Model both problems are strongly NP-hard.
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Gairing et al. [13] added that it is even hard to approximate the worst equilibrium social cost on identical links while there
is a PTAS for the best equilibrium social cost. Fischer and Vöcking [9] considered the worst mixed equilibrium.
The hardness proofs for extreme equilibria stated above are based on the users’ different sizes, i.e., the amount of
unsplittable traffic they send through the network and the close relationship to scheduling and bin-packing problems. The
question arises whether finding extreme Nash equilibria for unit-size users is substantially easier as for the unit-size case
the corresponding scheduling and bin-packing instances become polynomially solvable. Wewill show that most versions of
finding extreme equilibria are still NP-hard even for unit-size users. Up to now the complexity status of finding extreme
equilibria with respect to the makespan was only considered for the KP-Model. However, in this case finding extreme
equilibria for unit-size users is trivial because even for arbitrary non-decreasing latency functions on parallel links all Nash
Equilibria have equal and minimal makespan as shown by Epstein et al. [6].
The game describing unit-size users sending their unsplittable traffic through arbitrary directed networks with latency
functions on edges is called network congestion game and was already studied in the 1970’s by Rosenthal [20]. He
established that the more general congestion games possess pure strategy Nash equilibria. Fabrikant et al. [7] established
that for symmetric (single-commodity) network congestion games an arbitrary equilibrium can be computed in polynomial
time, but for asymmetric network congestion games or general symmetric congestion games it is PLS-complete to find an
equilibrium. Fotakis et al. [12] introduced that a Greedy approach yields a pure Nash equilibrium not only on parallel links
but also on series–parallel graphs.
Awerbuch et al. [2] established an upper bound of 52 on the price of anarchy for affine latency functions w.r.t. the total
latency as social objective function and unit-size users. Christodoulou and Koutsoupias [4] transferred this bound to the
makespan objective.
Weighted network congestion games, in which the users send different amounts of unsplittable flow, do in general not
possess pureNash equilibria due to Fotakis et al. [11]. On the contrary the authors established that for affine latency functions
the existence of a pure equilibrium is guaranteed.
Contribution. We consider (unweighted) network congestion games with arbitrary non-decreasing latency functions on
edges. Our negative results need only linear latencies `e(x) = aex.
We establish that finding a best or a worst Nash equilibrium concerning makespan social cost is not equally hard in the
following sense: We prove that on series–parallel graphs finding a best equilibrium is NP-hard. It is strongly NP-hard if
the number of users is part of the input and weakly NP-hard otherwise. Moreover, we suggest a pseudo-polynomial time
algorithm that determines a best Nash equilibrium on series–parallel graphs if the number of users is fixed. This indicates
that this problem is not strongly NP-hard. In contrast to this we show that a worst pure equilibrium can be found by the
Greedy approach of Fotakis et al. [12] on these graphs in polynomial time.
In general networks also finding a worst equilibrium is NP-hard. In fact, we prove it to be NP-hard in the strong sense
already for two users on an acyclic network with linear latencies.
A short version of this paper, not including full proofs, was presented at the 4th International Workshop on Internet and
Network Economics (WINE 2008) [15].
Road map. The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces our notation and preliminary results such as existence
of pure equilibria and computation of an arbitrary equilibrium. In Section 3 we discuss our results on finding a worst Nash
equilibrium and in Section 4 for a best Nash equilibrium, respectively.
2. Preliminaries
We consider N users of the same size, i.e., each routing the same amount of unsplittable flow from a single source s to
a single sink t through a directed graph G = (V , E). The edges of G are equipped with non-decreasing latency functions `e :
N0 → R+0 for all e ∈ E modeling the congestion effects. An instance of the game is thus given by (G = (V , E), (`e)e∈E,
s ∈ V , t ∈ V ,N). By scaling the latency functions appropriately we assume without loss of generality all users to have unit
size.
Let P denote the set of all simple s–t-paths in G and thus the strategy set of all users. In our context a flow is a function
f : P → N0 that assigns integer values to paths in the network. The latency on a path is the sum of the latencies on its edges
that depends on the total flow on the edge:
`P(f ) :=
∑
e∈P
`e
( ∑
P ′∈P :e∈P ′
fP ′
)
. (1)
We denote by fe := ∑P∈P :e∈P fP the flow on edge e uniquely induced by the flow f defined on paths. Note that there may
be different so-called flow-decompositions or flows on paths that correspond to the same flow on edges. Example 3 shows
that we need the information about paths for modeling the users’ behaviour in our game.
A Nash equilibrium is a stable situation in which no user wants to deviate from her chosen path because she cannot
decrease her experienced latency this way:
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Fig. 1. Nash equilibrium property might depend on flow-decomposition (Example 3).
Definition 1 (Nash Equilibrium, Nash Flow). A flow on paths f = (fP)P∈P is at Nash equilibrium, if and only if for all paths
P1, P2 with fP1 > 0 we have
`P1(f ) ≤ `P2(f˜ ) with f˜P =

fP − 1 if P = P1
fP + 1 if P = P2
fP otherwise.
(2)
Existence of Nash equilibria. Rosenthal [20] used the following potential functionΠ : F → R defined on the set of feasible
flows F to prove the existence of pure Nash equilibria in network congestion games:
Π(f ) =
∑
e∈E
fe∑
i=1
`e(i). (3)
Flows corresponding to local optima of this potential function constitute Nash equilibria. Fabrikant et al. [7] establish that
one equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time because a min-cost flow in the following instance MCF(G) minimizes
Rosenthal’s potential function and is thus a Nash flow.
Definition 2 (Min-cost Flow Instance, MCF(G)). Given a network congestion game (G = (V , E), (`e)e∈E, s ∈ V , t ∈ V ,N)
construct the corresponding min-cost flow instance as follows:
For every edge e ∈ E we need N copies with cost cei = `e(i), i = 1, . . . ,N . The capacities of all edges are 1 and we send
N units of flow from s to t .
Observe that every path decomposition of every optimal solution of the min-cost flow instance MCF(G) yields a Nash
equilibrium, as the negative cycle optimality condition for optimal min-cost flows directly implies that no user wants to
deviate from her chosen strategy. However, not every Nash equilibrium is also an optimal solution of the min-cost flow
instance (cf. Examples 6 and 7).
Note that there are instances and Nash flows (not global but local optima of Rosenthal’s potential) such that a different
path decomposition of the flow on edges induced by a Nash flow is not again Nash (cf. Example 3). Thus, it is necessary to
have the information about the flow on paths as the output of the game.
Example 3 (Nash Equilibria and Flow-Decompositions). Consider the instance given in Fig. 1 in which three users travel
from s to t . The latency functions are given as edge labels. In order to distinguish parallel edges (s, u) (or (u, t)), we call
them upper and lower edge between s and u (u and t).
Observe that the flow sending the first user on edge (s, t), the second user on the path consisting of the upper edge from
s to u and the lower edge from u to t and the third user on the path containing the so far unused edges is a Nash equilibrium.
The flow on every edge is equal to 1.
But if we change the flow-decomposition and send the second user on both upper and the third on the lower edges this
last user becomes unsatisfied because she would be better off changing to edge (s, t). Hence, not every path decomposition
of a flow on edges yields a Nash equilibrium.
Social cost. In this paper, we consider minimizing the makespan as the social objective function. This notion comes from
scheduling and is a priori only applicable to parallel link networks. Flows minimizing the following more general makespan
definition are sometimes also called min–max flows.
Definition 4 (Makespan, Social Cost). Given a flow on paths f = (fP)P∈P the makespan is given by
Cmax(f ) := max
P∈P :fP>0
`P(f ). (4)
Epstein et al. [6] showed that on parallel links all Nash equilibria have equal makespan but this does not hold in general:
Example 5 (Nash Equilibria with Different Non-optimal Makespans). Consider the instance given in Fig. 2 for two users. If
every edge is used by exactly one user and the paths are alternating between upper and lower edges then an optimal solution
with makespan 12 is achieved. Observe that in any Nash equilibrium there is exactly one user on every edge between s and
u1 and between u1 and u2 and there are two users on the upper edges between u2 and u3 and between u3 and t . A best Nash
equilibriumwith makespan 13 can be obtained if both users alternate between upper and lower connection on the first two
edges. However, one user may also choose the lower connections on both first edges. This yields again a Nash equilibrium,
which is worst and has makespan 14.
As in general the makespan of different Nash equilibria as well as an optimum makespan are not equal, we are now
interested in computing two extreme Nash equilibria.
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Fig. 2. Instance with several Nash equilibria (Example 3).
Fig. 3. The unique best Nash equilibrium does not imply an optimal min-cost flow (Example 6).
Fig. 4. The unique worst Nash equilibrium does not imply an optimal min-cost flow (Example 7).
Extreme Nash equilibria. We introduce the following two problems of finding a best or worst pure equilibrium, respectively.
Worst Nash Equilibrium (W-NE for short):
Given: Network congestion game (G = (V , E), (`e)e∈E , s ∈ V , t ∈ V , N)
Output: Nash equilibrium f with maximal makespan among all Nash equilibria.
Best Nash Equilibrium (B-NE for short):
Given: Network congestion game (G = (V , E), (`e)e∈E , s ∈ V , t ∈ V , N)
Output: Nash equilibrium f with minimal makespan among all Nash equilibria.
Note that the decision versions of these two problems are in NP for acyclic networks G, as in those networks for a given
flow f a longest path w.r.t. the fixed edge lengths `e(fe) can be computed in polynomial time [14].
Unfortunately, it can be shown that in general neither a best nor a worst Nash equilibrium is an optimal solution of
MCF(G):
Example 6 (Best Nash Flow not Optimal in MCF(G)). Consider the instance given in Fig. 3 for two users.
Then the uniquemin-cost flow f ∗ has a unique path decomposition f ∗Q1 = f ∗Q2 = 1withQ1 = (s, u1, u2, t) andQ2 = (s, t).
Clearly, f ∗ is a Nash equilibrium with Cmax(f ∗) = 7. On the contrary, consider the Nash equilibrium f with fP1 = fP2 = 1
where P1 = (s, u2, t) and P2 = (s, u1, t) which obviously does not yield a min-cost flow. However, the makespan of f is
equal to Cmax(f ) = 6.5.
Example 7 (Worst Nash Flow not Optimal in MCF(G)). In case of the worst Nash equilibrium consider the instance given in
Fig. 4 for two users:
The optimal solution f ∗ of MCF(G) for the graph given in Fig. 4 is unique and has a unique path decomposition sending
one user on Q1 = (s, u1, u4, t) and Q2 = (s, u3, u2, t) each with makespan Cmax(f ∗) = 2. However, f with fP1 = fP2 = 1
where P1 = (s, u1, u2, t) and P2 = (s, u3, u4, t) is a Nash equilibrium with Cmax(f ) = 3.
The fact that in general no worst Nash equilibrium is an optimal min-cost flow in MCF(G) is quite interesting because
in the special case of series–parallel graphs there always exists a worst Nash equilibrium that is an optimal solution of the
min-cost flow problemMCF(G). This follows from the result that the Greedy approach determines a worst Nash equilibrium
in series–parallel graphs (cf. Section 3.1).
Series–parallel graphs. As already mentioned we consider not only arbitrary network topologies but also series–parallel
networks. Series–parallel graphs can be defined inductively. A single edge e = (s, t) is series–parallel with start-terminal
s and end-terminal t by definition. Let Gi be series–parallel with start-terminal si and end-terminal ti (i = 1, 2). Then the
graph S(G1,G2) obtained by identifying t1 as s2 is a series–parallel graph, with s1 and t2 as its terminals (series composition).
And the graphG = P(G1,G2) obtained by identifying s1 as s2 and also t1 as t2 is a series–parallel graph (parallel composition).
This graph has s1(= s2) and t1(= t2) as its terminals (cf. [12]).
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This class of graphs has some very nice properties: Bein et al. [3] established that the Greedy approach solves the min-
cost flow problem in series–parallel graphs. Combined with the min-cost flow instance introduced by Fabrikant et al. [7]
this yields that the Greedy approach of iteratively assigning the users to a shortest path with respect to the latency induced
by the current flow plus an additional user on every edge yields a Nash equilibrium on series–parallel graphs. This result
was also obtained by Fotakis et al. [12] who call this algorithm GBR (Greedy Best Response) and we keep this notation.
3. Worst pure Nash equilibrium
In this section the complexity status of determining a worst Nash equilibrium is investigated. We prove that a Greedy
strategy solves the problem on series–parallel graphs and show strong NP-hardness for the problem on general graphs.
3.1. Special case of series–parallel graphs
In the following we show that the Greedy Best Response (GBR) algorithm introduced by Fotakis et al. [12] always leads
to a worst Nash equilibrium in series–parallel graphs. The idea of this algorithm is as follows: If one considers a setting
where the users arrive consecutively, a new user chooses her path such that her personal latency is minimized given the
flow induced by the users currently in the network. This choice is irrevocable, i.e., no user can change the strategy in the
future. More formally, let us denote by
L+(f ) := min
P∈P
∑
e∈P
`e(fe + 1) (5)
the minimum latency for a new (N + 1)st user given a flow f sending N users from s to t . According to GBR the new user
chooses her path PN+1 such that the latency of PN+1 is L+(f ). If a flow f ′ is obtained by a given flow f where a single user is
added according to GBR we use f ′ = f ⊕ PN+1. For series–parallel graphs it has been shown in [12] that if f is an arbitrary
Nash equilibrium then f ′ = f ⊕ PN+1 is again a Nash equilibrium. Note that this property does not hold in general graphs.
As a consequence GBR always leads to a Nash equilibrium if all users have the same size and the underlying network is
series–parallel. In this paper, we strengthen this result and show that the obtained Nash equilibrium is always a worst Nash
equilibrium. This holds for all latency functions that are non-decreasing. The next lemma, which is a key point in order to
prove our result, has already been used implicitly in [12]. It states that if we start with a Nash equilibrium and add onemore
user according to GBR then the latency of the new user is not less than the latency of all the previous users in the new flow.
Lemma 8. Let G = (V , E) be a series–parallel graph and f a Nash equilibrium for N users. If we choose PN+1 ∈ P according to
GBR we obtain a new Nash equilibrium f ′ = f ⊕ PN+1 such that
`PN+1(f
′) = Cmax(f ′).
Proof. Assume there is a path P such that `P(f ′) > `PN+1(f
′) and fP > 0. Then there exist path segments piN+1 and pi of PN+1
and P such that both segments start at some vertex u and end at v, are vertex-disjoint, and∑
e∈pi
`e(fe) =
∑
e∈pi
`e(f ′e ) >
∑
e∈piN+1
`e(f ′e ) ≥
∑
e∈piN+1
`e(fe). (6)
Note that the last inequality holds because the latency functions are non-decreasing. However, Eq. (6) is a contradiction to
the fact that f is a Nash equilibrium, because the user on path P would choose the path segment piN+1 instead of pi . Thus,
the result follows. 
The next two lemmata are dealing with the two compositions in the definition of series–parallel graphs. In fact, we give
a characterization of a Nash equilibrium in S(G1,G2) and P(G1,G2). Before the results are stated the following notation is
introduced. Let Gi be a series–parallel graph and fi : Pi → N0 a flow in Gi for i = 1, 2. Then the set of all simple s–t-paths in
P(G1,G2) is given by P1 ∪ P2. We define a new flow f in P(G1,G2) by f := f1 ∪ f2, where f : P1 ∪ P2 → N0 and f |Pi = fi
for i = 1, 2.
Lemma 9. Let fi be a flow in a series–parallel graph Gi for i = 1, 2. Then f = f1 ∪ f2 is a Nash equilibrium in P(G1,G2) if and
only if the following conditions are satisfied:
(1) fi is a Nash equilibrium in Gi for i = 1, 2,
(2) L+G1(f1) ≥ Cmax(f2) and L+G2(f2) ≥ Cmax(f1).
Proof. Note that the first condition implies that a user inGi does notwant to choose another path inGi. The second condition
guarantees that a user in G1 does not prefer a path in G2 or vice versa. Due to the fact that all edges of a path in P(G1,G2) are
either in G1 or G2 the result follows. 
We want to establish a similar result for the series composition. Therefore let Gi be series–parallel and fi : Pi → N0
a flow in Gi for i = 1, 2 for N users. Let us assume without loss of generality that the users choose the paths P1, . . . , PN
(Q1, . . . ,QN ) in G1 (G2). For each permutation φ of {Q1, . . . ,QN } we can obtain a new flow f in S(G1,G2) if we define a new
path for user i by P¯i = Pi ∪ Qφ(i). The set of all flows that can be obtained this way will be denoted by f1 ⊗ f2.
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Lemma 10. Let fi be a flow in Gi for i = 1, 2. Let f ∈ f1⊗ f2 then f is a Nash flow in S(G1,G2) if and only if fi is a Nash equilibrium
in Gi for i = 1, 2.
Proof. Note that in G the vertex t1 = s2 is a cut vertex and hence every s–t-path in G has to pass this vertex. Thus, if f1 and
f2 are Nash equilibria no user in Gwants to choose another path. The other direction follows also immediately. 
We are prepared to prove Theorem 11 stating that GBR finds a worst Nash equilibrium on series–parallel graphs.
Theorem 11. If G is a series–parallel graph then GBR finds aworst Nash equilibrium inO(Nm) time, wherem denotes the number
of edges of G.
Proof. The proof of correctness is done by induction on the number of series–parallel composition operations. If G consists
of a single edge directed from s to t , then the statement holds, because all users have to use the edge (s, t) and this is the
only feasible flow through the network.
The next situation is if G is obtained by a series composition from G1 and G2. Let f be the Nash flow that was obtained
using GBR. Let fi = f |Pi for i = 1, 2. Then f ∈ f1 ⊗ f2 and fi are Nash equilibria in Gi for i = 1, 2. Note that f1 and f2 could
have also been obtained applying GBR to G1 and G2 separately. Thus, using the induction hypothesis f1 and f2 are worst Nash
equilibria. Moreover, due to Lemma 8 we obtain
Cmax(f ) = Cmax(f1)+ Cmax(f2)
because the last user added chooses a path in G1 and in G2 both of them having the largest latency. Suppose that there is
another Nash flow f ′ with Cmax(f ′) > Cmax(f ). Then, f ′ ∈ f ′1 ⊗ f ′2 where f ′1 and f ′2 are Nash flows. Note that
Cmax(f1)+ Cmax(f2) = Cmax(f ) < Cmax(f ′) ≤ Cmax(f ′1)+ Cmax(f ′2)
holds. This implies that Cmax(f ′1) > Cmax(f1) or Cmax(f
′
2) > Cmax(f2)which is a contradiction to the fact that f1 and f2 are worst
Nash equilibria.
Finally,we consider a parallel composition obtained fromG1 andG2. Let f be aNash equilibrium inG = P(G1,G2)obtained
by GBR where 1 ≤ k ≤ n users route their paths in G1 and n− k players choose a path in G2. The corresponding flows in G1
and G2 are denoted by f1 and f2, i.e., f = f1 ∪ f2. We assume without loss of generality that
Cmax(f ) = Cmax(f1) ≥ Cmax(f2) (7)
holds, i.e., the user with the largest latency has chosen a path in G1.
If k = n all users choose a path in G1 and using the induction hypothesis this is a Nash equilibrium in G1. Moreover, this is
also a Nash equilibrium in P(G1,G2). This is true because of Condition 2 of Lemma 9 which is satisfied due to the fact that
the last user has chosen her way according to GBR. So let us assume that 1 ≤ k < n.
By the induction hypothesis fi is a worst Nash equilibrium in Gi for i = 1, 2 with k and n − k users. It follows also from
the induction hypothesis that the social cost of a worst Nash equilibrium in Gi is non-decreasing with respect to the number
of users.
Let us assume that there is a worst Nash equilibrium f ′ in G with Cmax(f ′) > Cmax(f ) with f ′ = f ′1 ∪ f ′2 where l users
choose a path in G1. If l = k then a contradiction is immediately obtained because f1 and f2 are worst Nash equilibria. Let us
assume that l > k. Then,
Cmax(f ′2) ≤ L+(f ′2) ≤ Cmax(f2) (8)
is satisfied. The first inequality holds, because f ′2 is a Nash flow in G2. The second inequality is true because if a new user
chooses her path with respect to f ′2 the new flow is a Nash equilibrium with n − l + 1 ≤ n − k users. Due to the fact that
Cmax(f2) are the worst social cost in any Nash flow with n − k users and the monotonicity of the social cost equation (8)
follows. Thus, using (7) we obtain
L+(f ′2) ≤ Cmax(f2) ≤ Cmax(f1) = Cmax(f ) < Cmax(f ′)
and it can be concluded that there is a user in G1 with the largest latency with respect to f ′. Let us denote the corresponding
path by P ′, i.e., Cmax(f ′) = `P ′(f ′). Then L+(f ′2) < `P ′(f ′) implies that the user on path P ′ wants to switch to a path in G2
which is a contradiction to the assumption that f ′ is a Nash equilibrium.
The case where l < k can be done in a similar way.
GBR performs N shortest path computations in a series–parallel graph with n vertices andm edges. On acyclic (di)graphs
one shortest path computation can be done in linear time O(m) using a topological sorting of the vertices as described in
Ahuja et al. [1]. 
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Fig. 5. Variable gadgets for variables uk and uk+1 .
3.2. Complexity status on general graphs
Before proving NP-hardness of the problem of finding a worst Nash equilibrium, we consider a related problem that is
called Blocking Path problem:
Blocking Path Problem (BlockP for short):
Given: Digraph G = (V , E)with source s ∈ V and sink t ∈ V .
Question: Does there exist an s–t-path P ∈ P such that after deleting the edges of P
there is no path from s to t?
Theorem 12. The Blocking Path Problem is strongly NP-complete even on acyclic networks.
Proof. Observe that BlockP is in NP. We show that there exists a polynomial reduction from 3SAT. An instance I(3SAT) of
3SAT is given by a set U = {u1, . . . , un} of variables and a collection C = {c1, . . . , cm} of clauses over U such that each clause
contains exactly three literals. The question is whether there exists a truth assignment for C . 3SAT is known to be strongly
NP-hard [14].
Based on I(3SAT) an instance I(BlockP) of BlockP is constructed in the following way: The graph consists of variable
and clause gadgets and vertices s and t . A variable gadget for uk (k = 1, . . . , n) consists of two paths (yk, xk, x′k, y′k) and
(yk, x¯k, x¯′k, y
′
k). The edge (xk, x
′
k) corresponds to uk = True while (x¯k, x¯′k) models uk = False. The variable gadgets are
connected by edges (y′k, yk+1) for k = 1, . . . , n−1. Moreover, there are edges (s, y1) and (s, y′k) and (yk, t) for k = 1, . . . , n.
These edges make sure that each edge (y′k, yk+1) must be contained in P . Finally, we add edges (s, xk) and (s, x¯k) for
k = 1, . . . , n. This completes the definition of the variable gadgets. See Fig. 5 for an illustration.
For each clause cj there is a clause gadget that contains the vertices zj and z ′j . Moreover, there are three parallel paths from
zj to z ′j , namely (zj, a
1
j , a
2
j , a
3
j , z
′
j ), (zj, a
4
j , a
5
j , a
6
j , z
′
j ) and (zj, a
7
j , a
8
j , a
9
j , z
′
j ). Each path corresponds to one literal in cj. Moreover
there are two vertices bj and b′j and an edge (bj, b
′
j). These two vertices are connected with the three disjoint paths between
zj and z ′j by the following edges: (a
2
j , bj), (a
5
j , bj), (a
8
j , bj) and (b
′
j, a
3
j ), (b
′
j, a
6
j ), (b
′
j, a
9
j ).
In order to make sure that P traverses each clause gadget we add edges (s, bj) and (b′j, t) for j = 1, . . . ,m. Finally, the
clause gadgets are connected with edges (z ′j , t) and (z
′
j , zj+1) for j = 1, . . . ,m− 1 and (z ′m, t). See Fig. 6 for an illustration.
The variable and clause gadgets are connected in the following way: There is an edge (y′n, z1). Moreover, if uk is the ith
literal in clause cj then add (x′k, a
3i−2
j ) and if u¯k is the ith literal in clause cj then add (x¯
′
k, a
3i−2
j ).
This completes the construction of instance I(BlockP). We show that I(BlockP) is a YES-instance, i.e., there exists a
blocking path from s to t if and only if I(3SAT) is satisfiable.
Assume that I(3SAT) is satisfiable. Then P runs through all variable gadgets in such a way that it uses edge (xk, x′k) if
uk = True and (x¯k, x¯′k) otherwise. Then the path continues its journey through the clause gadgets. Since I(3SAT) is satisfiable
there are at most two literals that are not true. Assume without loss of generality that the first literal is true. Then the path
starts in zj and continues with (a4j , a
5
j , bj, b
′
j, a
9
j , z
′
j ) and finally moves to the next clause gadget until it arrives at t . Assume
that P is not a blocking path then there exists a path P˜ from s to t that does not contain any edge of P . Hence, the predecessor
of t on P˜ is a vertex of type yk for k = 1, . . . , n or of type z ′j or b′j for j = 1, . . . ,m. However, all incoming edges into yk for
k = 1, . . . , n and all incoming edges into b′j for j = 1, . . . ,m are blocked. Therefore, there must exist a clause cj such that P˜
enters the clause gadget of cj, travels through it and leaves it at z ′j to t . P˜ must enter the clause gadget via a
1
j because all other
paths through the gadget are blocked. But since the predecessor of a1j in the associated variable gadget has no incoming
edges (because the literal is true) this leads to a contradiction. Therefore, P is a blocking path.
On the other hand, assume that there exists a blocking path P in I(BlockP). Obviously, Pmust travel through every variable
gadget because otherwise there would exist a non-blocked path of the form (s, y′k, yk+1, t). Therefore, the truth setting of
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Fig. 6. Clause gadget for clause cj .
the variables is defined according to which path of the variable gadget is chosen. Assume that there exists a clause cj where
all three literals are false. Then all three vertices a1j , a
4
j and a
7
j are reachable from s via the corresponding variable gadgets.
Hence, there are three disjoint paths from s via the variable gadgets, the clause gadget of cj and z ′j to t . P must contain edge
(bj, b′j) and hence blocks at most two of these three disjoints paths. This leads to a contradiction to the blocking property
of P . 
The Blocking Path Problem is used to show that determining a worst Nash equilibrium in general networks is NP-hard
even for two users.
Theorem 13. Determining a Worst Pure Nash equilibrium is strongly NP-hard even for two users on acyclic networks and with
linear latency functions.
Proof. Consider an instance I(BlockP) of the strongly NP-complete Blocking Path problem. Let G = (V , E) be the acyclic
network of instance I(BlockP) with s, t ∈ V . An instance of I(W-NE) is defined on a graph G′ = (V , E ′) which contains the
same vertex set as G and E ′ = E ∪ {(s, t)}. Since G′ is acyclic it is possible to define a bijective function pi : V → {1, . . . , n}
such that pi(i) < pi(j) if (i, j) ∈ E. Given any such bijection pi the latency functions are given by
`e(x) = (pi(j)− pi(i))x, e = (i, j) ∈ E.
Observe that due to this definition of the latency functions of edges in G every path from s to t is a shortest path with respect
to the edge lengths `e(1). Let L∗ be the length of a shortest path from s to t in Gwith respect to edge lengths `e(1) for e ∈ E.
Then the latency of (s, t) is defined by `(s,t)(x) = (L∗ + 12 )x.
Assume that there exists a blocking path P∗ in I(BlockP). Let P1 = P∗ and P2 = (s, t). Then the flow on paths f is given
fP1 = fP2 = 1 while the flow on all other paths is equal to zero. Obviously, Cmax(f ) = L∗ + 12 holds. It remains to show that
f is a Nash equilibrium. Observe that f is a Nash equilibrium if and only if neither the user of path P1 nor the user of P2 can
decrease her latency by changing to another path. Consider path P1: Every path P in G has latency L∗ as long as there is one
user on P2. Moreover, `P2(f˜ ) = 2L∗ + 1 for f˜P2 = 2. Hence, the user of P1 has no reason to change to another path in G′. In
the second step, we consider path P2: Consider the flow f˜ with f˜P1 = f˜P = 1 for some path P in G. Observe that P shares at
least one edge e′ with P1 and since all slopes of latency functions in G are integral, we have `e′(1) ≥ 1. Therefore,
`P(f˜ ) =
∑
e∈P
`e(f˜ ) ≥
∑
e∈P\{e′}
`e(1)+ `e′(2)
=
∑
e∈P
`e(1)+ `e′(1) = L∗ + `e′(1) ≥ L∗ + 1.
Since `P2(f ) = L∗ + 12 < `P(f˜ ) holds for all alternative paths P in G the flow f is a Nash equilibrium.
On the other hand, assume that there exists a Nash equilibrium f withmakespan Cmax(f ) ≥ L∗ + 12 . We distinguish three
cases:
• There exists a path P1 and fP1 = 2. If P1 = (s, t) we know that `P2(f ) = 2L∗ + 1. However, consider the flow f˜ with
f˜P2 = f˜P = 1 for some path P in G. Then `P(f˜ ) = L∗ < `P2(f )which contradicts the fact that f is a Nash equilibrium.
If P1 is a path in G, we know that `P1(f ) = 2 · L∗. But this implies that one user wants to change to P2 = (s, t) because
her latency would be only L∗ + 12 this way. So this situation can not occur in a Nash equilibrium.
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• There are two non-identical paths P1, P2 in G with fP1 = fP2 = 1: Since f is a Nash flow, no user benefits from changing
to path P = (s, t). Hence, Cmax(f ) ≤ L∗ + 12 holds. But L∗ and Cmax(f ) are integral which yields Cmax(f ) ≤ L∗ < L∗ + 12 .
This leads to a contradiction to the lower bound on the makespan.
• There exist paths P1 in G and P2 = (s, t)with fP1 = fP2 = 1:We show that P1 is a blocking path in G. Assume that P1 is not
blocking. Then there exists a path P ′ from s to t in G such that P ′ has no edge in commonwith P1. Consider the flow f˜ with
f˜P1 = f˜P ′ = 1. Then `P ′(f˜ ) = L∗ implies `P2(f ) = L∗ + 12 > L∗ = `P ′(f˜ ). This leads to a contradiction to the assumption
that f is a Nash equilibrium and therefore P1 is a blocking path in G. 
4. Best pure Nash equilibrium
In this section, we show several complexity results concerning the problem of determining a best Nash equilibrium. All
results given in this section hold even for series–parallel graphs. We show that computing a best Nash equilibrium for N
users is strongly NP-hard if N is part of the input. If the number of users is fixed then the problem remains weakly NP-hard.
At least for series–parallel graphs this result is best possible because there exists a dynamic programming algorithm with
pseudo-polynomial running time.
4.1. Strong NP-hardness result
In this subsection, we prove that finding a best Nash equilibrium on series–parallel graphs is strongly NP-hard if the
number of users is part of the input. We show this by a reduction of the corresponding decision problem to the numerical
3-dimensional matching problem, which is known to be strongly NP-complete (see [14]).
Numerical 3-Dimensional Matching (N3M for short):
Given: Disjoint sets X, Y , Z , each containing m elements, a weight w(a) for all
elements a ∈ X ∪ Y ∪ Z and a bound B ∈ Z+ s.t.∑a∈X∪Y∪Z w(a) = mB.
Question: Does there exist a partition of X ∪ Y ∪ Z into m disjoint sets A1, . . . , Am
such that each Aj contains exactly one element from each of X , Y and Z and∑
a∈Ai w(a) = B for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m.
A partition of X ∪ Y ∪ Z into m disjoint sets A1, . . . , Am such that each Aj contains exactly one element from each of X ,
Y and Z is called a feasible solution. Moreover,
∑
a∈Ai w(a) = B for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m if and only if
∑
a∈Ai w(a) ≤ B for all
1 ≤ i ≤ m.
Theorem 14. Determining a best Nash equilibrium is strongly NP-hard on series–parallel graphs if the number of users is part of
the input.
Proof. Consider an instance I(N3M) of N3M. Observe that we may assume without loss of generality that w(a) < 2w(b)
and w(b) < 2w(a) for each pair a, b ∈ X . Otherwise a large number M can be added to all elements in the set X and to B
until the desired condition is satisfied. If we addM to the bound B the new instance is equivalent to the original one due to
the fact that each Aj should contain exactly one element of X . Note that the same can be done for the sets Y and Z .
Based on this instance we construct the following series–parallel graph G = (V , E): Let V = (s, u, v, t) and for each
element in the set X (Y , Z) we introduce a directed edge from s to u (u to v, v to t). The latency function of an edge e is given
by `e(x) = w(a)xwherew(a) is the weight of the corresponding element in the instance I(N3M).
Observe thatw(a) < 2w(b) for all a, b in X (Y , Z) implies that f is a Nash flow if and only if f is a flow such that every edge
is used by exactly one user. Therefore, if f is a Nash flow then every path P with fP = 1 corresponds to a feasible subset Ai
of I(N3M) and vice versa. We are given a one-to-one correspondence between Nash flows and feasible solutions of I(N3M).
Moreover, the total weight of elements in Ai is equal to the latency on the associated path P . Therefore, there exists a Nash
flow with makespan at most B if and only if I(N3M) is a YES-instance. 
4.2. Weak NP-hardness for fixed number of users
This subsection deals with the problem of determining a best Nash equilibrium if the number of usersN is fixed. Consider
the even-odd partition problem which is known to be weakly NP-hard:
Even-odd Partition (EOP for short):
Given: Finite set A = {a1, a2, . . . , a2n}, a size w(ai) ∈ Z+ for each ai ∈ A and
2B =∑2ni=1w(ai).
Question: Does there exist a subset A′ ⊂ A with∑a∈A′ w(a) = B and A′ contains
exactly one element of {a2i−1, a2i} for i = 1, . . . , n.
Similar to the arguments used in Section 4.1 we may assume without loss of generality that w(a2i−1) < 2w(a2i) and
w(a2i) < 2w(a2i−1) holds for i = 1, . . . , n.
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Theorem 15. Determining a best Nash equilibrium is weakly NP-hard even for two users and on series–parallel graphs.
Proof. Given an instance I(EOP) then an instance I(B-NE) is defined by a graph G = (V , E)with V = {v1, v2, . . . , vn, vn+1}
and two parallel edges between vi and vi+1 for i = 1, . . . , n + 1. Consider the two edges between vi and vi+1 then one
edge has latency `e(x) = w(a2i−1)x and the other one has latency `e(x) = w(a2i)x. Finally, two users travel from s = v1 to
t = vn+1. We use exactly the same ideas as for the proof of Theorem 14 to show that I(EOP) is a YES-instance if and only if
there exists a Nash equilibrium in I(B-NE)with makespan at most B. 
4.3. A pseudo-polynomial time algorithm for series–parallel graphs
In this subsection, we discuss a dynamic programming approach to find a best Nash equilibrium in series–parallel graphs
if the number N of users is not part of the input. Let f be a Nash equilibrium in a graph G for k users which choose the paths
P1, . . . , Pk. Then we define a multiset
C(f ) := {`P1(f ), . . . , `Pk(f )}
which will be called cost profile of f . Note that several Nash equilibria can have the same cost profile. The idea of the
algorithm is to decide if for a given multiset C = {c1, . . . , ck} with 0 ≤ k ≤ N there exists a corresponding Nash flow
f with k users. This is done using the inductive definition of series–parallel graphs. In order to decide if a cost profile can be
realized by a Nash flow f = f1 ∪ f2 in P(G1,G2)we need to know L+(fi). More formally, for a given multiset C = {c1, . . . , ck}
and a graph Gwe define
SG(C) := max{L+(f ) | C(f ) = {c1, . . . , ck}, f is a Nash flow}.
If such a Nash equilibrium does not exist we set SG(C) := −∞. Hence, all cost profiles with SG(C) ≥ 0 do have a
corresponding Nash flow f . Let us discuss the algorithm in more detail.
(1) A single edge (s, t).
For the simplest series–parallel graph there is a unique flow for all 0 ≤ k ≤ N and all users have latency `(s,t)(k). Thus,
we obtain immediately
SG(C) =
{
`(s,t)(k+ 1) if C = {`(s,t)(k), . . . , `(s,t)(k)}, |C | = k ≤ N,
−∞ otherwise.
(2) The series composition.
Let C = {c1, . . . , ck} be given. Note that this cost profile can only be obtained by a Nash flow f ∈ f1 ⊗ f2 with
Ci := C(fi) = {c i1, . . . , c ik} for i = 1, 2 and C = {c11+c2φ(1), . . . , c1k +c2φ(k)} for some permutation φ. If such a permutation
exists we write C1 ⊗ C2 = C . Moreover, L+(f ) = L+(f1) + L+(f2) because every s–t path in G has to pass the vertex
t1 = s2. Thus, we obtain
SG(C) = max
C1⊗C2=C
{SG1(C1)+ SG2(C2)}. (9)
(3) The parallel composition.
Let C = {c1, . . . , ck} be given. A corresponding Nash flow f is of the form f1 ∪ f2 with C1 := C(f1) = {c11 , . . . , c1k1},
C2 := C(f2) = {c21 , . . . , c2k2}, k1 + k2 = k and C = C1 ∪ C2. Moreover the conditions of Lemma 9 have to be satisfied, i.e.,
max{c11 , . . . , c1k1} ≤ SG2(C2) and max{c21 , . . . , c2k2} ≤ SG1(C1). The shortest path in G with respect to the flow f is given
by min{L+(f1), L+(f2)}, because the shortest path in P(G1,G2) chooses either a path with edges in G1 or in G2. Thus,
SG(C) = max
C=C1∪C2|C1 |+|C2 |=k
max{c|c∈C1}≤SG2 (C2)
max{c|c∈C2}≤SG1 (C1)
min{SG1(C1), SG2(C2)} (10)
is satisfied.
Note that it is straightforward to get the best Nash flow at the end if the corresponding flows which determine SG(C)
during the algorithm are stored as well. In order to analyze the running time of this algorithm, note that for a graph G and a
fixed number k of users there are at most (|V |L)
k
k! = O((|V |L)k) different multisets, where L := maxe∈E `e(N) is themaximum
latency on an edge and a simple path can have at most |V | edges. Due to the fact that this is needed for all 0 ≤ k ≤ N ,
the number of multisets that have to be stored is at most N(|V |L)N = O((|V |L)N). It is easy to see that for the series and
parallel composition (9) and (10) can be done in polynomial timewith respect to the number ofmultisets. Thus, the proposed
dynamic programming approach is pseudo-polynomial, which implies that B-NE is indeed not NP-hard in the strong sense
for series–parallel graphs.
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5. Conclusion
In this paper we give a full characterization of the complexity of finding extreme Nash equilibria w.r.t. makespan social
cost in symmetric network congestion games.
Finding a best Nash equilibrium, i.e., one with minimal makespan, is NP-hard on series–parallel graphs. More precisely, it
is NP-hard in the strong sense if the number of users is part of the input and weakly NP-hard if the number is fixed. We
additionally give a pseudo-polynomial dynamic programming algorithm to find a best Nash equilibrium for a fixed number
of users on series–parallel graphs.
On the other hand, the problem of finding a worst Nash equilibrium, i.e., one with maximal makespan, can be solved in
polynomial time on series–parallel graphs by aGreedy algorithm introduced by Fotakis et al. [12]. Unfortunately this positive
result is not true for arbitrary acyclic networks, as we show that finding a worst Nash equilibrium is NP-hard in the strong
sense even for a fixed number of users on these graphs.
In order to establish the latter result we introduce a new graph theoretical decision problem, asking whether a directed
graph contains a blocking path, and prove it to be NP-complete in the strong sense.
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